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THE DISEMBODIED-STATIC BRAIN
APPROACH TO ASD
No two individuals with the autism diag-
nosis are ever the same—yet many prac-
titioners and parents can recognize signs
of ASD very rapidly with the naked eye.
What, then, is this phenotype of autism
that shows itself across such distinct clini-
cal presentations and heterogeneous devel-
opments? The “signs” seem notoriously
slippery and resistant to the behavioral
threshold categories that make up current
assessment tools. Part of the problem is
that cognitive and behavioral “abilities”
typically are theorized as high-level dis-
embodied and modular functions—that
are assessed discretely (impaired, normal,
enhanced) to define a spectral syndrome.
Even as biology reminds us that organic
developing bodies are not made up of
independent switches, we remain often
seduced by the simplicity of mechanis-
tic and cognitive models. Developmental
disorders such as autism have accord-
ingly been theorized as due to different
modular dysfunctions—typically of corti-
cal origin, i.e., failures of “theory of mind”
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), of the “mir-
ror neuron system” (Ramachandran and
Oberman, 2006), of “weak central coher-
ence” (Happe and Frith, 2006) or of the
balance of “empathizing” and “system-
izing” (Baron-Cohen, 2009), just to list
a few.
The broad array of autonomic (Ming
et al., 2005; Cheshire, 2012) and senso-
rimotor (Damasio and Maurer, 1978;
Maurer and Damasio, 1982; Donnellan
and Leary, 1995; Leary and Hill, 1996;
Donnellan and Leary, 2012; Donnellan
et al., 2012) differences experienced and
reported by people with autism have
by such theories typically been side-
lined as “co-morbidities,” possibly sharing
genetic causes, but rendered as incidental
and decisively behaviorally irrelevant
symptoms—surely disconnected from
cognition. But what if the development
of cortically based mental processes and
autonomous control relies on the com-
plexities and proper function of the
peripheral nervous systems? Through such
an “embodied” lens the heterogeneous
symptoms of autism invites new inter-
pretations. We propose here that many
behavioral-level findings can be re-defined
as downstream effects of how developing
nervous systems attempt to cope and adapt
to the challenges of having various noisy,
unpredictable, and unreliable peripheral
inputs.
Self-advocates have long tried to
describe their unique phenomenologi-
cal experiences—and many talk about not
being able to trust, feel, or control their
bodies as they would intentionally prefer.
Many tell us that parts of their bodies seem
to disintegrate experientially, that sen-
sory stimulations are either too intensely
invading or go unnoticed, entirely collaps-
ing into each other as echoes (Savarese,
2007; Robledo et al., 2012; Amos, 2013).
Such experiences of living and coping with
ASD, along with the widespread reports
of sensorimotor and autonomic differ-
ences have led us to explore the hypothesis
that individuals with autism are cop-
ing with unreliable peripheral signals
from atypically self-organized subsys-
tems. On the basis of recent sensorimotor
findings (Torres et al., 2013) discussed
below we speculate that various kinds of
peripheral noise result in unpredictabil-
ity of the person’s movements and their
re-afferent kinesthetic proprioception.
These in turn impede central coordina-
tion and autonomous control, and force
the developing system to find alternative
avenues of prediction and anticipatory
control.
SENSING THROUGH
MOVEMENT—NOT ALL VARIABILITY IS
CREATED EQUAL
What do we mean by noise? Noise might
be defined as any kind of sensed phe-
nomenon or change that cannot be inter-
preted as a signal (Kosko, 2006). Thus, the
idea of noise instantly craves a discussion
of how we interpret or make sense of the
stochastic world that impinges on all our
afferent nerves at any point in time; aka the
riddle of sense perception that has haunted
natural philosophers since antiquity. How
can we, with a body in constant motion,
get to a coherent and stable perception of
anything? The scientific and philosophical
world is starting to wake up to the idea
that this riddle must be solved through
understanding the dynamics of predictive
anticipation not only of own body position
and motion in time, but also the con-
tents of what is perceived (Friston, 2012).
But how do we do this if our movements
are always inherently variable—even when
trying to reproduce the same movement?
(Bernstein, 1967).
What have often been overlooked are
the processes and relevance of contin-
uously accumulating evidence from the
fluctuations in our motions. By gain-
ing a probabilistic expectation about the
variability itself, the system can acquire
predictable and reliable “motor priors.”
Rather than merely adding “noise” (Faisal
et al., 2008), sensory-motor variability can
serve as actively sampled and sharpened
informative “signals” and as an aid in
adaptively reshaping old priors.
CORRUPTED MOTOR PRIORS IN ASD
Using a new statistical platform for behav-
ioral analyses (SPBA) (Torres and Jose,
2012) a new study has begun the experi-
mental estimation of the idiosyncratic pat-
terns of movement variability unique to
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each person. By itself a single fluctua-
tion in our motions (micro-movement)
is not informative. However, when looked
at as stochastic processes, the continu-
ous flow of our natural behaviors reveal
the family of probability distributions best
describing the degrees of predictability and
reliability in the behavioral variability of
each person. Applying the SPBA, one can
see that the statistical properties of our
behavior undergo maturation. Typically
developing (TD) children begin to gain
reliable and predictable re-afferent feed-
back of limb micro-movements around
4 years of age. By college age, young grad-
uates manifest even more predictable and
reliable patterns with a broader bandwidth
of values (Torres et al., 2013). However,
none of the 34 subjects with ASD (ages
4–25)—independent of verbal proficiency
and gender—showed predictive micro-
movements. Rather their fluctuations were
random and “memoryless.” The speed-
dependent variability from prior trials was
not more predictive of future trials than
was the variability from a current trial. In
this sense the movement variability from
experiencing the “here and now” seemed
to be the only useful kinesthetic informa-
tion to them. Moreover, the bandwidth
of speed values was very narrow in ASD,
despite their ability to reach the goals of
the task.
People with matured “motor priors”
can learn to sense the statistics of the
impinging world “through” their own
movement fluctuations. When predictable
and reliable, these serve as malleable
anchors to adaptively help separate inter-
nal from external influences and enable the
system discriminate intended from spon-
taneous variations (Torres, 2013). Given
the acquired ability to integrate the sensed
local motor expectations and other sensed
influences, the overall background enables
unexpected sensed re-afferent variability
to fluidly morph from noise to perceptual
signal rather flexibly, as any new situation
might require.
People with autism have goal-
directness, but their re-afferent feedback
(kinesthetically sensed though their move-
ments fluctuations) fails to establish
reliable probabilistic expectations of their
own movement variations. Lack of motor
priors impedes acquisition of baselines to
build an embodied perceptual foundation.
Without such a frame of reference to assess
new contextual variations as signals, every
variation and contextual influence inten-
sifies the noise already inherent in the
movement. Accordingly it could be inter-
esting to empirically explore a possible
connection between absence of baseline
motor expectation and difficulties with,
for example, cross-modal integration
(Iarocci and McDonald, 2006). Mapping
their own physical movement variations
onto those of others in the social scene
must be difficult for the person with
autism—a tractable hypothesis using the
new SPBA (Johnson et al., 2012). Under
the kinesthetic re-afference hypothesis we
can begin to understand social withdrawal
or timidity as a coping response to the
intense uncertainty and loss of control
that social situations must produce in the
person with autism.
We should stress that the absence of
reliable “motor priors” in ASD does not
give us the causes of autism. However, it
helps begin to define the challenges in new
inclusive ways, where the affected person
is part of the solution. By precisely and
objectively quantifying movement sens-
ing in autism, we can begin to develop
an operational definition that refines our
understanding and offers tractable routes
of behavioral intervention, even when the
causes are unknown. This definition will
not merely enumerate what is different
or deficient in the autistic system rel-
ative to what is known in the typical
system. It will, instead, harness what-
ever compensatory-adaptive solution the
autistic system has already developed and
work with that to help steer their per-
formance toward social-communicative
goals.
These findings can be seen as comple-
menting the intense world syndrome the-
ory (Markram et al., 2007; Markram and
Markram, 2010). Movement variability
could also help define the phenotype
in animal essays by bridging experi-
mental manipulations at the molecu-
lar level with precise measurements of
behavioral outcomes showing their intense
manifestations.
The model that we propose con-
ceives sensory-motor exchange as a
dynamic-stochastic process, whereby the
noise-to-signal ratios evolve in the sys-
tem as behavior unfolds over time with
non-stationary statistics (Torres, 2013;
Torres et al., 2013). We can track the
shifts in stochastic signatures with pre-
cise statistical indexes of reliability and
predictability in real-time. We can also
measure the bandwidth of values that
each person has access to through the re-
afferent kinesthetic information. Thus, we
are in a position to tackle the heterogeneity
of ASD. Progress can be evaluated to deter-
mine the rates of change of their stochastic
trajectories and to track the changes in
the signs of the derivative of this pro-
cess to experimentally construct optimal
vs. sub-optimal scenarios in real situa-
tions. Performance can then be steered
by closing the stochastic sensory-motor
feedback loops to selectively co-adapt the
autistic system with the type of sensory
guidance that recruits, modulates, and
enhances central autonomy over the body.
This would then allow us to tap into many
of the solutions that the autistic system has
already self-discovered. Their system can
show us the optimal path of least resistance
[in a very precise physical sense (Lanczos,
1966; Feynman et al., 2006)]: the path
that accelerates learning. In this regard
our model is by definition inclusive of the
individual with ASD.
SEPARABLE ANATOMY AND TIME
SCALES OF PROPRIOCEPTIVE
DEVELOPMENT
The empirical evidence discussed above
involves the rather slow maturation of
the limbs and hands sensory-motor vari-
ability. However, phylogenetic evolution
and specialization of the facial and hand
muscles differ in time and order of appear-
ance, as suggested by the cytoarchitec-
tonics of the cerebral cortex (Allman,
1999; Mountcastle, 2005). It is thus our
proposition that the atypical trajectories in
maturation of motor priors accompanied
by a consistent embodied differentiation
between central and peripheral influences
may manifest and be detectable much ear-
lier in the stochastic signatures of facial
micro-expressions. The latter are sup-
ported by important cranial nerves that
innervate orofacial muscles critical for sur-
vival in neonates (Porges, 2003). Functions
include suckling, swallowing, developing
movement patterns to assist mastication
later on, and generally coordinating sound
production and reception to communicate
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distress or pleasure to the progenitor.
Emotional content and autonomic regu-
lations delivered by the active configura-
tion and spontaneous relaxation of these
muscles critically depend on the feedback-
loops involving these nerves (Bazhenova
et al., 2007; Field and Diego, 2008). To
understand the full range of autistic symp-
toms we must, as proposed by Porges, look
at the dynamics between phylogentically
distinct but interacting systems (Porges
et al., 1994; Bazhenova and Porges, 1997;
Porges, 2003). Understanding and objec-
tively quantifying movement fluctuations
as a form of re-afferent kinesthetic input in
neurotypical infants may lead us to earlier
detection of critical aberrancies potentially
leading to neurodevelopmental differences
with complex downstream regulatory con-
sequences.
In conclusion, we propose to shift the
almost exclusive focus on cortical issues in
autism to the issues in the peripheral ner-
vous systems and their dynamic contribu-
tion to the heterogeneity of the disorder. In
so doing, we will be able to non-invasively
quantify these differences in real-time dur-
ing therapeutic interventions, drug treat-
ments, and natural behaviors in general.
The adaptive progress in each person can
be tracked, and this can help sort out
genetic or traumatic causes and assist in
the development of personalized therapies.
Such therapies will be driven by objec-
tive real-time quantification of noise as the
autistic system shows us how it transforms
it and steers it into predictable and reli-
able signals for anticipatory autonomous
control.
It is time that we seek to better
understand how the distributed intelli-
gence of our bodies and social envi-
ronments scaffolds our cortical control
functions for self-autonomy. The mea-
surable re-afferent micro-movements can
help us track the dynamics of embod-
ied minds and thereby also move autism
research, diagnoses and treatments toward
a new frontier—one that includes and
truly connects us with the most important
piece of this puzzle: the individual with
autism.
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